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Abstract. Several pairing-based cryptographic protocols are recently
proposed with a wide variety of new novel applications including the ones
in emerging technologies like cloud computing, internet of things (IoT),
e-health systems and wearable technologies. There have been however a
wide range of incorrect use of these primitives. The paper of Galbraith,
Paterson, and Smart (2006) pointed out most of the issues related to the
incorrect use of pairing-based cryptography. However, we noticed that
some recently proposed applications still do not use these primitives cor-
rectly. This leads to unrealizable, insecure or too inefficient designs of
pairing-based protocols. We observed that one reason is not being aware
of the recent advancements on solving the discrete logarithm problems in
some groups. The main purpose of this article is to give an understand-
able, informative, and the most up-to-date criteria for the correct use of
pairing-based cryptography. We thereby deliberately avoid most of the
technical details and rather give special emphasis on the importance of
the correct use of bilinear maps by realizing secure cryptographic pro-
tocols. We list a collection of some recent papers having wrong security
assumptions or realizability/efficiency issues. Finally, we give a compact
and an up-to-date recipe of the correct use of pairings.
Keywords: Pairing-Based Protocols, Bilinear Maps, Security, Efficiency,
The Discrete Logarithm Problem.
1 Introduction
Pairing-based cryptography has received much attention because of wide
variety of its immediately deployable applications. These applications in-
clude identity-based encryption, functional and attribute-based encryp-
tion, searchable encryption, short/group/ring signatures, signcryption,
homomorphic linear authenticators for integrity checking, security, pri-
vacy and integrity solutions for cloud computing and Internet of Things
(IoT), e-health systems, and wearable technologies. We refer to Appendix
7 for a selected list of some novel applications using pairing-based cryp-
tography. In practice, Voltage Security (now an HP company) and Trend
Micro are the most well-known companies utilizing the pairing-based se-
curity solutions [66].
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There have been unfortunately a collection of results using the pairing-
based primitives incorrectly. In fact, Galbraith, Paterson, and Smart drew
attention to the potential problems related to using these “black boxes”
incorrectly [35]. However, we notice that many recent research papers still
have security vulnerabilities, realizability issues and/or efficiency prob-
lems since the appearance of [35]. These papers (surprisingly) either have
pairing related wrong security assumptions regarding the infeasibility of
certain computational problems and/or efficiency issues. The main rea-
son is to use pairing-based primitives as “black-boxes” without giving
attention on the concrete realizations of these primitives.
The security of pairing-based cryptosystems relies on the difficulty
of various computationally hard problems related to the discrete loga-
rithm problem (DLP). However, there are also new attacks on the DLP
on some groups [3,8,37,39,69]. Furthermore, very recent results on solv-
ing the DLP for finite fields of medium characteristics and composite
degrees size have also significant consequences on the choice of primi-
tives for pairing based cryptography [45, 48, 72]. In particular, designers
need to update the previously used key sizes for composite embedding de-
grees. Both attacks have also major consequences on the design of secure
cryptographic protocols based on pairing-based cryptography. Hence, one
additional relatively new reason of incorrect use of pairing-based primi-
tives is to ignore these recent technical advancements in solving the DLP
which make certain security assumptions incorrect. The complexity of
these mathematical preliminaries is undoubtedly the reason of neglecting
the realization concerns in the design of pairing-based protocols.
In this work, our aim is to highlight the importance of correct choices
and their affect on the realizability of abstract pairing requirements to
design cryptographic protocols with prescribed level of security, realiz-
ability and desired efficiency. In this respect, we briefly survey the most
recent attacks against pairing-based cryptography which have direct ef-
fects on the designs and the security models of cryptographic protocols.
We further emphasize the concerns in the paper of Galbraith, Paterson,
and Smart [35] together with further new security issues and their impli-
cations. We stress thereby that this paper does not propose new improve-
ments or new mathematical techniques but deliberately give attention to
the incorrect use of pairings. Therefore, our purpose is to give an informa-
tive and less technical overview of pairing-based mechanisms which briefly
surveys the various pairing-based real-world applications while taking the
recent mathematical improvements having direct security and efficiency
implications into account. Furthermore, we give a more detailed list on
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various pairing related hard problems together with their relation to the
security assumptions of the underlying pairing-based protocols. We fi-
nally propose a compact and state-of-the-art recipe for designers to take
it into consideration for proper usage. This recipe covers main security
and realizability issues of pairing-based cryptography which may help the
designers to use the primitives correctly.
2 Basics for Pairing-Based Cryptography
We begin with the abstract pairing requirements and different types of
bilinear maps used in cryptographic protocols.
Let (G1,+) and (G2,+) be two additive cyclic groups of (nearly)
prime order q with G1 =< P > and G2 =< Q >, (GT , ·) be a multi-
plicative cyclic group of order q with GT =< g >. We write as usual 0
for the identity elements of G1, G2 and 1 for GT . A pairing or a bilinear
map is a map e : G1 ×G2 → GT satisfying the following properties:
– Bilinearity: For all P1, P
′
1 ∈ G1, Q1, Q′1 ∈ G2, e is a group homo-
morphism in each component, i.e.
1. e(P1 + P
′
1, Q1) = e(P1, Q1) · e(P ′1, Q1),
2. e(P1, Q1 +Q
′
1) = e(P1, Q1) · e(P1, Q′1).
– Non-degeneracy: e is non-degenerate in each component, i.e.
1. For all P1 ∈ G1, P1 6= 0, there is an element Q1 ∈ G2 such that
e(P1, Q1) 6= 1,
2. For all Q1 ∈ G2, Q1 6= 0, there is an element P1 ∈ G1 such that
e(P1, Q1) 6= 1.
– Computability: There exists an algorithm which computes the bi-
linear map e efficiently.
There are essentially 4 types of bilinear maps [35, 74] used in the
design of pairing-based protocols depending on the special requirements
such as short representation, hashing to a group element, efficient homo-
morphisms.
– Type-1: G1 = G2. In this case there exists no short representations
for the elements of G1.
– Type-2: G1 6= G2 and there is an efficiently computable homomor-
phism φ : G2 → G1. In this case no efficient secure hashing to the
elements in G2 is possible.
– Type-3: G1 6= G2 and there exists no efficiently computable homo-
morphism φ : G2 → G1.
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– Type-4: G1 6= G2 and there exists an efficiently computable homo-
morphism φ : G2 → G1 as in the case of the Type-2 setting but with
an efficient secure hashing method to a group element [74]. Security
proofs can be quite cumbersome in this setting as discussed in [50].
We note that this type is not generally used in protocol designs due
to its inefficiency.
The main disadvantage of the Type-2 pairing is that there exists no
random sampling algorithm from G2 (yielding to a secure hash function)
which maps arbitrary elements to G2, [35, pp. 3119]. Note that there
exists a natural, efficient, and secure transformation of protocols using
the Type-2 pairing into protocols using the Type-3 pairing [17, Section
5].
The Type-1 setting is commonly called symmetric pairing while other
types are called asymmetric pairing.
Properties and Conversion of Types. Since the situation G1 6= G2
with efficiently computable homomorphisms (in both directions) is essen-
tially the same with the Type-1 setting (by identifying the groups via
explicit homomorphisms), we do not consider it separately.
The main technical part of pairing-based cryptography is the pairing
functions including Weil, Tate and Ate pairing defined mostly on the
product of certain subgroups of low dimensional abelian varieties over
finite fields (in practice either on subgroups of elliptic curves or jacobians
of genus two hyperelliptic curves) [10].
Due to efficiency and realizability concerns of pairing-based protocols
many ad hoc and conceptual conversion methods from one type of pair-
ing to another one has been proposed [20,71,82]. Abe et al. [2] proposed
a generic framework converting not only the protocols with the Type-1
bilinear maps into the Type-3 setting but also converting corresponding
security proofs using black-box reduction methods in the random oracle
model. Akinyele et al. [4] have very recently given some concerns about
the practicability of the elegant theoretic solution of [2] and proposed an
automated software tool transforming schemes using the Type-1 bilinear
maps into the Type-3 setting. We note however that the proposed auto-
mated tool in [4] and generic frameworks in [2] suffer from being inefficient
when compared to their manual counterparts like [20,71,82]. In [4, p. 20],
it is left as an open problem to generalize and systematize the manual
advancement more efficiently for automated tools.
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Basic Computational Problems related to Pairing: For complete-
ness of the paper, we briefly summarize the basic computational problems.
Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n and P ∈ G be its generator (here
additively written). In order to useG for cryptographic purposes, we need
the existence of the efficient algorithms available to compute in the group
G. Hence, the isomorphism between (Z/nZ,+) and (G,+) can explicitly
be given and efficiently computable via
φ : Z/nZ−→G, a 7→ aP.
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) asks to find the preimage in
Z/nZ of an arbitrarily chosen element in G, i.e. to find a for a given
pair (P, aP ), where a is chosen randomly in Z/nZ. If the DLP is not
intractable, in other words, if one can efficiently compute φ−1(Q) for any
Q ∈ G, then all pairing related hardness assumptions will be wrong, i.e.
they cannot be used to design secure cryptographic protocols.
The computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to compute abP for a
given triple (P, aP, bP ) where a, b are chosen randomly in Z/nZ. The deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman problem is to decide Q
?
= abP for a given quadruple
(P, aP, bP,Q) where a, b are chosen randomly in Z/nZ. Due to Pohling-
Hellman reduction it is usual to assume thatG has a (nearly) prime order
r (or has a large prime order subgroup of order r, respectively).
Provided that there exists a DLP solver for the image group GT one
has the following well-known fact by Frey-Ru¨ck and Menezes et al.:
Theorem 1. [32,65] If there exists a bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → GT ,
then the DLP in G1 and G2 can be solved in polynomial time in the
number of digits if there exists a DLP oracle for GT .
In the literature this attack is known as the MOV reduction at-
tack.The result follows in a straightforward manner by the assumption
that the pairing function e is efficiently computable: Given P ∈ G1 and
aP ∈ G2, we can compute e(P,Q) ∈ GT and e(P, aQ) = e(P,Q)a ∈ GT .
Then the DLP solver for GT can be used to obtain a [32, 65].
3 Attacks on Pairing-Based Cryptography
Several attacks on the DLP have recently been proposed improving the
function field sieve algorithm in the multiplicative group of finite fields of
small characteristics [3,8,37,39,69]. There are serious implications of these
attacks on the security of pairing-based cryptography. More concretely,
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the use of symmetric pairing, and hence the use of pairing-friendly ellip-
tic/hyperelliptic curves over fields of small characteristic are essentially
useless [3, 39]. Concrete attacks are performed for certain supersingular
elliptic/hyperelliptic curves over F2 and F3, see [3,39]. Difficulties of gen-
eralizing these attacks on the elliptic curve setting are pointed out in a
recent work of Massierer [64]. However, it can be argued more generally
that the use of elliptic curves over finite fields of small characteristics
in group-based cryptography has severe potential security threads. Espe-
cially, a very recent conjectural algorithm of Semaev [73] shows that the
believed security level of 285 bits for a NIST elliptic curve over F5712 can
be reduced asymptotically to a security level of 101.7 bits using a variant
of Weil descent attack although there is not a consensus on the validity
of such asymptotical conjectures [33].
In this section we summarize the attacks on pairing-based cryptogra-
phy together with their implications.
3.1 Recent Advances in solving the DLP
The difficulty of the DLP depends on the description of the underlying
group G. Indeed, Shoup showed that the intractability of the DLP is
closely related to the algorithms available to the description of G. He
further shows that in generic groups the computation of the discrete log-
arithms costs at least Ω(
√
p), where p is the largest prime divisor of
the order of G [76]. In particular, computing the discrete logarithms in
generic groups requires approximately
√
p computation in G. Recent ad-
vances on solving the DLP for finite fields have major consequences on the
secure design of pairing based protocols. There are mainly two new at-
tacks (1) quasi-polynomial DLP solver for small characteristics field, and
(2) a more efficient variant of a DLP solver for medium characteristics
fields of composite degree.
1. It was a well-known fact that the DLP for the multiplicative subgroups
of finite fields is not as difficult as in the generic groups. However,
many research has been done using these groups for cryptographic
purposes by neglecting possible use of the algorithmic description of
these groups to solve the discrete logarithm instances. The situation
has been dramatically changed with the recent advancements of Joux
et al. [8] and Go¨loglu et al. [37]. Recently, Granger et al. [40] im-
proved the result of Joux et al. [8] by proposing a new expected
quasi-polynomial algorithm for solving the DLP for finite fields Fkq
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with roughly q ≈ k. These attacks removed the DLP for multiplica-
tive subgroups of small characteristic finite fields from the list of in-
tractable problems.
2. Very recent results on a variant of the number field sieve algorithm for
solving the discrete logarithm problem in medium characteristics finite
fields of composite degrees have direct consequences on the choice
of key sizes for pairing based algorithms [45, 48, 72]. The complexity
analysis of these new techniques suggests that doubling the sizes of
the underlying elliptic curves is a conservative choice of maintaining
the desired security level.
Explicit realization of the bilinear maps can be done if GT is a sub-
group of the multiplicative group of a finite field. In particular, the DLP
on G1 and G2 can be transferred into the subgroup of a finite field by
Theorem 1. Hence, the algorithms for solving the DLP for finite fields
are applicable on the discrete logarithm instances of pairing groups G1
and G2. Therefore, these new attacks have direct consequences on the
security of many pairing-based cryptographic applications if the charac-
teristic of the field defining G1 is small [47]. In fact, subsequent results
applying the idea of this algorithm (combined with Frey-Ru¨ck and MOV
attacks [26]) showed the fatal security issues for cryptographic protocols
using the Type-1 bilinear maps [3, 8, 39,69].
In particular, for a group of size n with
Ln(α, c) = exp((c+ o(1))(log n)
α(log log n)1−α),
where 0 < α < 1, c > 0, Barbulescu et al. [8] improved the previous
bound for solving the DLP of Joux from Ln(1/4) for a specified c to
nO(logn) for fields of the form Fkq with roughly q ≈ k. The key idea is to
use a new and elegant approach for the descent phase.
Realization of Bilinear Maps: In order to understand the impact
of these attacks on the design of pairing-based cryptographic protocols,
we now briefly summarize the realization of bilinear maps using suitable
elliptic curves for cryptographic purposes.
Over a finite field Fq with q = p
m, p a prime andm ∈ N, the candidate
groupsG1 andG2 in the definition of bilinear maps are certain subgroups
of a carefully chosen elliptic curve E over Fq. In particular,G1 is the r−th
torsion subgroup E(Fq)[r] andG2 is a certain group related to the explicit
realization of the bilinear map. We refer to [10] for further details.
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The abstract condition on the efficient computation of
e : G1 ×G2 → GT
is realizable using Tate, Weil, Ate, and optimal pairing of elliptic curves,
see for example [41]. More concretely, given an elliptic curve E over Fq the
function e takes rational points of E over Fq or Fqk as inputs and outputs
elements of F∗
qk
, where k is the smallest integer with the property that r
divides qk−1. the value k is called the embedding degree of E with respect
to r. To achieve the desired security and efficiency in G1, G2 and GT the
ratio log qk/ log r = kρ with ρ = log q/ log r has to be balanced. We refer
to [30] for the details. For implementation and comparison purposes, one
can consult Table 1 following the lines of [67].
Table 1. Comparison with the recommended security levels for pairing groups, cor-
responding embedding degrees, ρ, and #of modular multiplications (MM) over the
prime field Fr for Ate and twisted Ate pairing using Barreto-Naehrig curves, (groups
G1 and G2 have the same prime order r, GT is a subgroup of Fqk of order r, k is the
embedding degree which is the smallest integer such that r|(qk − 1), i.e. k is the order
of q mod r) [67].
Security r qk k with Ate Twisted Ate
Level (bits) (bits) (bits) ρ ≈ 1 Pairing (k = 12) Pairing (k = 12)
80 160 960-1280 6-8 4647 MM 7800 MM
128 256 3000-5000 12-20 7119 MM 12480 MM
192 384 7000-9000 18-24 17007 MM 31200 MM
256 512 14000-18000 28-36 33486 MM 62400 MM
The probability that a randomly chosen (nearly) prime order elliptic
curve E has small enough embedding degree is negligibly small (gener-
ically k is in O(q)) [30, 63]. Hence, special pairing-friendly curves have
to be constructed in order to realize an efficiently computable function e
with the property that the DLP is still intractable. Supersingular elliptic
curves were initially the natural candidates of realizing such efficiently
computable functions e with the desired security level. The reason was
that supersingular elliptic curves have embedding degrees k = 2, 4 or 6
depending on whether char(Fq) 6= 2, 3, char(Fq) = 2 and char(Fq) = 3, re-
spectively [10]. We refer to [30] for further details on constructing curves
with larger embedding degrees, i.e. the construction of ordinary pairing-
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friendly curves over prime fields with complex multiplication (CM) tech-
niques (both families and individual curve constructions).
Consequences of the Quasi-Polynomial Attacks on Pairing-Based
Cryptography As briefly outlined above, the new attacks for solving the
DLP on the multiplicative subgroup of small characteristic finite fields
have also dramatic consequences for the design of pairing-based proto-
cols. In fact, these attacks showed either the insecurity of the use of
supersingular elliptic curves (all pairing-friendly elliptic curves over fields
of characteristic 2 or 3) or the inefficiency of their usage (all supersingular
curves defined over a large characteristic prime field) in the pairing-based
settings [3, 8, 37, 39, 69]. Since the Type-1 pairing can only be realized
using supersingular elliptic/hyperelliptic curves [35] we see in Section 4
that all Type-1 bilinear maps and the related protocols are either useless
or regarded completely as insecure.
Consequences of the Attacks for Composite Degree Finite Fields
on Pairing-Based Cryptography The attack of Barbulescu and Kim
[48] reduces the complexity of solving the DLP problem on Fnp from
Ln(1/3,
3
√
96/9) to Ln(1/3,
3
√
48/9) if n = κη with gcd(κ, η) = 1 and
κ, η > 1. Recently, Jeong and Kim removed the condition gcd(κ, η) = 1
implying that if n is composite, the previous key sizes could be dou-
bled asymptotically to guarantee the same security level of the disrete
logorithm problem. Since, most pairing friendly elliptic curves have com-
posite embedding degree (i.e. BN curves have embedding degree 12), one
needs to be careful for the choice of elliptic curves, and to change their
sizes according to these new attacks. Using a more conservative but less
efficient elliptic curves of embedding degree one would also be an alterna-
tive to implement pairing-based protocols. For the choice and right notion
of types of pairings of embedding degree one we refer to the recent article
of Chattarjee et al. [19].
3.2 Minimal Embedding Field Attacks
Hitt [42] observed that the minimal embedding degree FordNpp is not nec-
essarily equal to the field Fkq , i.e. the extension can be defined over Fp
instead of over Fq. Hence, in this case the group GT can be realized as
a subgroup of much smaller field yielding to solve the DLP more effi-
ciently in G1, G2 and GT . Note that this attack is only applicable for
pairing-friendly curves defined over non-prime fields.
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3.3 Subgroup Attacks
Usually pairing functions are realized in such a way that two out of three
groups G1, G2 and GT are proper subgroups of larger composite order
subgroups. This results in the so-called subgroup attacks if especially the
underlying pairing implementation is not testing the group membership of
the elements. Barreto et al. defined the concept of subgroup security and
pointed out that most implementations of bilinear maps do not satisfy
this notion [9]. They suggested new curve parameters using the known
families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves achieving the subgroup security.
4 Hard Problems Related to Pairing
There are plenty of pairing related computational and decisional prob-
lems. Their intractabilities form the basic security assumptions upon
which pairing-based cryptographic protocols are designed. In this section,
we only focus on the most general and frequently used hard problems.
4.1 Pairing Inversion Problem
A necessary straightforward security assumption is the one-wayness of the
underlying pairing function e. The generalized pairing inversion problem
(GPInv) asks to find P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) = g for a
given pairing function e and a value g ∈GT . This problem can be divided
into two subproblems:
– The fixed argument pairing inversion problem 1 (FAPI-1) is to find
Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) = g for a given P ∈ G1 and g ∈ GT .
– The fixed argument pairing inversion problem 2 (FAPI-2) is to find
P ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) = g for a given Q ∈ G2 and g ∈ GT .
A simple observation shows that for each given pair (P, g) ∈G1×GT
or (Q, g) ∈ G1 × GT both problems FAPI-i, i = 1, 2, have a unique
solution by non-degeneracy of e and cyclicity of G1,G2 and GT . Note
that in the explicit realization of pairings FAPI-i (in terms of the size of
the input (P, g) or (Q, g)) can be solved at most in subexponential time
since there exists a subexponential DLP solver for GT (in terms of the
input size of G1, G2 and GT ) by Theorem 1 and discussion in Section
3.1. Again by the discussion in Section 3.1 and Theorem 1 it follows that
FAPI-i can even be solved in quasi-polynomial time since there exists a
quasi-polynomial DLP solver for GT for certain choices of G1, G2 and
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GT . For a detailed relation of the pairing inversion problems and the
Diffie-Hellman type assumptions we refer to [34].
Bilinear maps can be computed mainly in two stages. The first one is
to compute the evaluation of a certain function at a certain divisor of the
underlying elliptic curve E by using Miller’s algorithm [10]. The second
stage is the final exponentiation. For the details about the relationship be-
tween the individual steps (Miller inversion and inverting exponentiation)
and the pairing inversion problem we also refer to [34].
4.2 Diffie-Hellman Related Problems
Other most common pairing related problems are as follows:
Definition 1 (Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problems
[10]).
Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a non-degenerate bilinear pairing. Then
– The bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem 1 (BDH-1) asks to find e(P,Q)ab
for given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and random a, b.
– The bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem 2 (BDH-2) asks to find e(P,Q)ab
for given P ∈G1, aQ, bQ ∈ G2 and random elements a, b.
A frequently used variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in
the Type-1 setting (G1 = G2) is given as follows:
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem [10]).
Let e : G1×G1 → GT with a cyclic group G1 =< P > is given. Then
– The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is to decide
whether h = e(P,P )abc for given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 with random
elements a, b, c and a random element h ∈ GT .
It is clear that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problems including the
pairing related ones are solvable in polynomial time when one has oracles
solving the computational Diffie-Hellman problems. However, there are
groups for which the classical decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy
while the classical computational Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to
be hard. In particular, a gap Diffi-Helman group has a distinguishability
oracle for which solving the computational problem is hard [15, 46]. In
the Type-1 pairing setting the Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem is formally
defined as follows:
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Definition 3 (Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem [15,46]). Given groups
G1 and G2 of prime order q, a bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → GT and a
generator P of G1. The Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (Gap DH) asks to
compute abP for given instance (P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem and a
DDH oracle.
Definition 4 (Co-Assumptions [14]).
– The Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem asks to compute aQ
for given P , aP ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 for a random element a.
– The Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem asks to decide whether
aQ = R for given P , aP ∈ G1 and Q, R ∈ G2, for a random el-
ement a.
Assume additionally that G1 6= G2. Then,
– The Computational Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem asks to com-
pute e(P,Q)abc ∈ G1 for given (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G31 and (Q, aQ, cQ) ∈
G32 for random elements a, b and c.
– The Decisional Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem asks to distin-
guish P, aP, bP,Q, e(P,Q)ab from P, aP, bP,Q, e(P,Q)z for random
elements a, b and z.
It is trivial to see that the Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman problem is
easy to solve if we have an efficiently computable bilinear map.
The relationship between the CDH and FAPI-1 and FAPI-2 problems
is given by the following theorem of Galbraith et al. [34] whose proof
follows for a CDH instance (P, aP, bP ) easily from first calling the FAPI-
1 oracle with the inputs (P, e(aP,Q)) to obtain aQ for a random element
Q and calling secondly the FAPI-2 oracle (Q, e(bP, aQ)):
Theorem 2. Let e : G1×G2 → GT be a non-degenerate bilinear pairing
on cyclic groups of prime order r. Suppose one can solve FAPI-1 and
FAPI-2 in polynomial time. Then one can solve the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem in G1, G2 and GT in polynomial time.
Similar to the above argumentation the following result is also proved
in [34]:
Theorem 3. Let notation be as above. If one can solve FAPI-1 (resp.
FAPI-2) in polynomial time then one can compute all non-trivial group
homomorphisms φ2 : G2 → G1 (resp. ψ2 : G2 → G1) in polynomial time.
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We continue with an assumption which is frequently used in the design
of pairing-based protocols:
Definition 5 (The external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption
[12]). Let the CDH be intractable in both G1 and G2. The external Diffie-
Hellman assumption (XDH) states that the DDH is also intractable in
G1. If the DDH is also intractable in G2 we have the symmetric external
Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH).
Remark 1. It is easy to see that the GDH problem is only realizable with
the Type-1 pairing, and the strict XDH assumption (i.e. if SXDH does
not hold) corresponds exactly to the Type-2 setting. Furthermore, the
SXDH assumption is only realizable in the Type-3 setting.
There are also several cryptographic protocols whose security relies
on other pairing related problems with auxiliary inputs:
Definition 6 (Pairing problems with auxiliary inputs [23]). Let
the elements g, gα, · · · , gαd in G1 (resp. G2) be given with a random ele-
ment α. Then, the DLP with auxiliary inputs (DLPwAI) is to compute α.
Solving the DLPwAI implies the solution of many pairing-based problem
assumptions. These are called pairing problems with auxiliary inputs.
These include the Weak Diffie-Hellman (wDH) Problem, the Strong
Diffie-Hellman (sDH) Problem, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI)
Problem and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) Problem.
Remark 2. The generalized DLP with auxiliary inputs problem (GDLP-
wAI) is to compute a randomly chosen α if g, gα
e1 , · · · , gαed in G1 (resp.
G2) are given and K := {e1, · · · , ed} is a multiplicatively closed subset
of Z×r−1 [24].
We note that some generalized versions of the Weak Diffie-Hellman
(wDH) Problem, the Strong Diffie-Hellman (sDH) Problem, the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Inversion(BDHI) Problem and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (BDHE) Problem can also be vulnerable if the GDLPwAI is
solved.
5 Security or Efficiency Issues of Recent Papers
In this section, we revisit a collection of recently proposed research papers
in order to illustrate the incorrect use of the pairing-based primitives.
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– In [44], the authors propose a batch verification mechanism which
aims to verify multiple digital signatures at a time less than the total
individual verification time. The authors prove the security of their
scheme under the collusion attack assumption using the Type-1 setting
with supersingular elliptic curves [44, pp.2526] having security issues
as discussed in Section 3.1. We note also that this issue still applies
most recent papers in cryptography journals such as [43,51,57,70].
– In [79], the authors present a new Type-1 pairing-based multi-receiver
encryption scheme and authenticated key establishment protocol for
vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET). Its security analysis relies on
the system of [78] which is based on the underlying Gap DH, hence
realizable only in the Type-1 setting. Their example with a 512 bit
supersingular elliptic curve with embedding degree 2 is too inefficient
since the same security level can be guaranteed in the asymmetric
setting for instance with a Barreto-Naehrig curve of 160 bits [30].
– In [55], the authors proposed an authenticated encryption system us-
ing the Type-1 setting aiming to accomplish confidentiality and au-
thenticity simultaneously. This scheme is applied to email system as
a practical example. Unfortunately, the proposed example does not
have any complexity advantage over the current system. The scheme
is also too inefficient because of the use of the Type-1 setting as in
the previously mentioned schemes.
– In [38] the authors propose a privacy-preserving scheme for incentive-
based demand response in the smart grid. The smart grid technology
basically uses the information and communication technologies aiming
to enhance the efficiency, reliability, sustainability of the generation,
transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity. They used
a Type-1 pairing although the security of the scheme relies on the
existence of an efficiently computable homomorphism in the Type-2
setting as stated in [38] using the unforgeability of BBS+ signature
[12]. Therefore, the scheme has to be modified into a more efficient
Type-3 setting in the light of [17].
– Unlike wired networks, mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are more
vulnerable to some attacks bringing new security challenges (e.g., lim-
ited resources, open peer-to-peer network, dynamic network topology,
lack of a trusted centralized authority). Therefore, designing and im-
plementing more efficient cryptographic algorithms, key management,
secure neighbor detection, and routing protocol are some of the ac-
tive research areas. Certificate-less (mostly pairing-based) public key
based solutions are known to be one of the best candidates. But after
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surveying the pairing-based MANETs, we again realize the incorrect
use of the Type-1 setting and counting the pairing operation as a
black-box, see for instance [36].
– In [25], the authors proposed a solution for scalable data sharing in
cloud storage using key-aggregate cryptosystems using the Type-1 set-
ting. A subsequent paper [60] deals with a cloud data sharing scheme
utilizing supported keyword search. It also suffers from the use of the
Type-1 setting. For instance, in the latter paper, the security of the
scheme relies on the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman
problem which is no longer secure for supersingular elliptic curves over
small characteristic finite fields as discussed in Section 3.1.
– The authors in [58] proposed a mechanism using the Type-1 setting
for data integrity verification for the Internet of Things (IoT) appli-
cations, where the integrity of an outsourced data is the most crucial
security property. The authors did not unfortunately modify the orig-
inal BLS idea into the Type-3 setting.
– In [62] the authors proposed secure data transmission mechanism for
cluster-based wireless sensor networks using the Type-1 setting. Their
analysis in [62, pp. 758], however, cannot be realized in this setting.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is much less efficient than the author’s
quantitative calculation.
– The author proposes in [80] a remote data integrity checking model
in multi-cloud platforms. The scheme uses the Gap DH assumptions
like most of their counterparts (public auditing schemes) and hence
uses the Type-1 setting. In the simulation of the scheme the author
argued to use 160 bit elliptic curve for the underlying bilinear map. It
is impossible to obtain a secure mechanism using such a small order
elliptic curve (either insecure for curves over a field of characteristic
3 or insecure since the embedding degree is 2 over large fields due to
the discussions in Section 3.1.)
– In [27], Coron and Naccache proved that the Co-Diffie Hellmann prob-
lem and the k-element aggregate extraction problem are equivalent
with the assumption that there exists an efficiently computable homo-
morphism φ : G2 → G1. Recently, in [83] Xie und Zhang proposed
a secure incentive scheme for delay tolerant networks under the k-
element aggregate extraction problem using the Type-1 setting. How-
ever, it is impossible to convert their scheme into the Type-2 setting.
The reason is that their scheme uses the existence of an efficient and
secure hashing to point map into G2, which is in fact not realizable
in the Type-2 setting as discussed in Section 2.
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– Kundu and Bertino [49] proposed an authentication mechanism using
the Type-1 bilinear maps under the k-element aggregate extraction
problem in order to achieve confidentiality-preserving authentication
of trees and graphs. As in the above mechanism, an asymmetric mod-
ification of the scheme can only be realized in the Type-2 setting since
the author uses the original BGLS [14] aggregate signatures. However,
this cannot be realized either, since one requires efficient and secure
hashing to a point map into G2.
6 Recipe for Designers
The following conditions have to be taken into consideration by designing
cryptosystems using bilinear maps:
– Use the Type-3 Setting: Although there are automated tools con-
verting protocols using the Type-1 bilinear maps into protocols using
the Type-3 bilinear maps [2, 4] and a general framework converting
the Type-2 schemes into the Type-3 schemes [17], it is always better
to design cryptosystems using directly the Type-3 pairing to achieve
the best security level and the most efficient protocols. However, one
must also be careful about the new complexity bounds on the DLP if
the chosen embedding degree is 6 or 12 [48].
– Choose the Best Pairing Function: One should use efficient com-
putation in pairing-friendly groups. In other words use optimal pair-
ing [41] or its efficient variants as much as possible. The pairing func-
tion should be specified in order to obtain the best efficiency security
trade off.
– Begin with a Correct Set-Up: Implementation details should be
given more concretely (what is the desired security level?) and always
together with its usability (which pairing Type is used?) and practical
aspects (what is the computation and communication overhead?) and
realizability aspects (which pairing function has to be used?.
– Use Realizable Security Assumptions: It is crucial to avoid un-
realizable security assumptions. Furthermore, the assumptions about
the security level should be carefully stated using concrete constraints.
For a typical example, one may believe that “it is always easy to gen-
erate efficiently suitable system parameters for pairing-based cryp-
tosystems” which is clearly wrong as outlined above. See Table 1 for
the concrete realizability constraints.
– Do Not Use Extensions of Binary and Ternary Curves: One
should be careful about more destructive security issues resulting from
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Table 2. Revised version of the comparison of different pairing types [35, Table 1]. A
checkmark X denotes that the pairing type satisfies the property and ✗ denotes that it
fails to satisfy the property. The # of * measures the efficiency of the underlying pairing
type (*** denotes the most efficient choice). Note that p denotes the characteristic of
the field over which the curve is defined (i.e. over Fq with q = p
n).
Type Hash to Short Homomorphism Poly time Security Efficiency
G2 G1 generation
1 (p=2 or 3) X ✗ X ✗ ✗ **
1(large p) X ✗ X X X *
2 ✗ X X X X **
3 X X ✗ X X ***
attacks on the DLP over fields of small characteristics (following the
lines of Section 3.1).
– Avoid the Explicit Homomorphisms: A possible wrong use of the
asymmetric setting with the assumption of the existence of efficiently
computable homomorphisms leads to unrealizability and/or security
and privacy leakage. We note that in some applications there is a ten-
dency to use the asymmetric setting incorrectly with the assumption
of the existence of efficiently computable homomorphisms in both di-
rections (both from G1 to G2 and G2 to G1). See Table 1 for the
concrete realizability constraints.
– Use the Hashing to Point only in the Type-3 Setting: Pairing-
based cryptographic protocols may require the following underlying
assumptions simultaneously: (1) secure and efficient hashing into group
elements (2) efficient homomorphism from G2 to G1. This require-
ment can be vital in order to prove the security of the underlying
protocol or to design comparably more efficient mechanisms. How-
ever, since both requirements cannot be realized simultaneously in
practice, the design criteria should be checked carefully in order to
ensure the claimed security and efficiency while achieving a realizable
mechanism. See Table 1 for the concrete realizability constraints.
– Test Group Membership or Use Subgroup Secure Curves: In
order to undermine the implementation attacks (for instance, failing
to test the group membership) subgroup security has to be guaranteed
in the realization of pairing-based protocols by generating subgroup
secure pairing-friendly elliptic curves following the lines of [9].
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– Do Not Use Curves over Extension Fields, Use Prime Fields:
In order to estimate the desired level of security precisely, special
caution on the realizability of the minimal embedding field attack has
to be taken if the underlying elliptic curves are defined over extension
fields. In particular, the equality ordN (p) = mk needs to be hold,
where q = pm, G1 is a subgroup of N−th torsion subgroup of the
underlying elliptic curve over Fq and k is the embedding degree.
– Take the Correct Decision on the Key Sizes: In order to use
composite embedding degrees, the key sizes of the underlying elliptic
curves need to be updated by using the complexity results of recent at-
tacks on the medium size finite fields of composite degrees [45,48,72].
The complexity estimates of these new attacks suggest that doubling
the sizes of the underlying elliptic curves or using elliptic curves of
embedding degree one are already safe at the cost of additional com-
putational overhead.
– Be Careful about the Auxiliary Inputs: In order to avoid pos-
sible attack scenarios caused by solving the discrete logarithm with
auxiliary inputs (DLPwAI) [23] and its generalizations (GDLwAI) [24]
special caution has to be taken by the choice of the underlying elliptic
curves and the orders of G1 and G2. Especially, for the order r of G1
and G2 the values r−1 and r+1 should have no small divisors. More-
over, auxiliary exponents should not be closed with respect to the mul-
tiplication. This is important if one needs the security assumptions like
the Weak Diffie-Hellman (wDH) Problem, the Strong Diffie-Hellman
(sDH) Problem, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion(BDHI) Prob-
lem and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) for the design
of the pairing-based protocols.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to highlight once again the wrong usage of bilinear
maps in the recent research papers which unfortunately leads to security,
realizability and/or efficiency issues. Furthermore, with the practicality
and advantages of pairing-based technologies researchers should focus on
the correctness and the mathematical details instead of using them as
a “black-box”. Moreover, the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) and IEEE have been actively working on the correct ver-
sions of pairing-based cryptography to bring them to the state-of-the-art
advancements, but the current versions are vulnerable to the recent at-
tacks [1, 66].
Still Wrong Use of Pairings in Cryptography 19
References
1. IEEE standard for identity-based cryptographic techniques using pairings. IEEE
Std 1363.3-2013, pages 1–151, Nov 2013.
2. M. Abe, J. Groth, M. Ohkubo, and T. Tango. Converting cryptographic schemes
from symmetric to asymmetric bilinear groups. In Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO 2014, volume 8616 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 241–260.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014.
3. G. Adj, A. Menezes, T. Oliveira, and F. Rodr´ıguez-Henr´ıquez. Computing discrete
logarithms in F
36·137
using magma. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2014:57,
2014.
4. J. A. Akinyele, C. Garman, and S. Hohenberger. Automating fast and secure
translations from type-i to type-iii pairing schemes. In Proceedings of the 22Nd
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15,
pages 1370–1381. ACM, 2015.
5. T. Asami, B. Namsraijav, Y. Kawahara, K. Sugiyama, A. Tagami, T. Yagyu,
K. Nakamura, and T. Hasegawa. Moderator-controlled information sharing by
identity-based aggregate signatures for information centric networking. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information-Centric Networking,
ICN ’15, pages 157–166. ACM, 2015.
6. G. Ateniese and B. Medeiros. Financial Cryptography: 8th International Confer-
ence, FC 2004, Key West, FL, USA, February 9-12, 2004. Revised Papers, chapter
Identity-Based Chameleon Hash and Applications, pages 164–180. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004.
7. J. Baek and Y. Zheng. Identity-based threshold decryption. In 7th International
Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography (PKC), volume
2047, pages 262–276. Springer Berlin Heidelberg - Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 2004.
8. R. Barbulescu, P. Gaudry, A. Joux, and E. Thome´. Advances in Cryptology – EU-
ROCRYPT 2014: 33rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Ap-
plications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 11-15, 2014.
Proceedings, chapter A Heuristic Quasi-Polynomial Algorithm for Discrete Loga-
rithm in Finite Fields of Small Characteristic, pages 1–16. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014.
9. P. Barreto, C. Costello, R. Misoczki, M. Naehrig, G. Pereira, and G. Zanon. Sub-
group security in pairing-based cryptography. In Progress in Cryptology – LATIN-
CRYPT 2015, volume 9230 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 245–265.
Springer International Publishing, 2015.
10. I. Blake, G. Seroussi, and N. Smart. Advances in Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series). Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY, USA, 2005.
11. D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and E.-J. Goh. Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
2005: 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, Aarhus, Denmark, May 22-26, 2005. Proceedings, chap-
ter Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption with Constant Size Ciphertext, pages
440–456. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005.
12. D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and H. Shacham. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
2004: 24th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, Califor-
nia, USA, August 15-19, 2004. Proceedings, chapter Short Group Signatures, pages
41–55. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004.
20 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
13. D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing,
pages 213–229. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2001.
14. D. Boneh, C. Gentry, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Advances in Cryptology —
EUROCRYPT 2003: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, Warsaw, Poland, May 4–8, 2003 Proceedings, chapter
Aggregate and Verifiably Encrypted Signatures from Bilinear Maps, pages 416–
432. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
15. D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the weil pairing.
In Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2001, volume 2248 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 514–532. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.
16. V. Cakulev, G. Sundaram, and I. Broustis. IBAKE: Identity-Based Authenticated
Key Exchange. RFC 6539, 2012.
17. S. Chatterjee and A. Menezes. On cryptographic protocols employing asymmetric
pairings - the role of ψ revisited. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 159(13):1311–1322,
2011.
18. S. Chatterjee and A. Menezes. Type 2 structure-preserving signature schemes
revisited. In Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2015, volume 9452 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 286–310. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015.
19. S. Chatterjee, A. Menezes, and F. Rodriguez-Henriquez. On instantiating
pairing-based protocols with elliptic curves of embedding degree one. 2016.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/403 .
20. J. Chen, H. W. Lim, S. Ling, H. Wang, and H. Wee. Pairing-Based Cryptogra-
phy – Pairing 2012: 5th International Conference, Cologne, Germany, May 16-18,
2012, Revised Selected Papers, chapter Shorter IBE and Signatures via Asymmetric
Pairings, pages 122–140. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
21. L. Chen, Z. Cheng, and N. P. Smart. Identity-based key agreement protocols from
pairings. International Journal of Information Security, 6(4):213–241, 2007.
22. P. Chen, X. Wang, and J. Su. A hierarchical identity-based signature from compos-
ite order bilinear groups. In Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing,
volume 9532 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 46–56. Springer Inter-
national Publishing, 2015.
23. J. H. Cheon and T. Kim. A new approach to the discrete logarithm problem with
auxiliary inputs. 19(1):1–15, 2016.
24. J. H. Cheon, T. Kim, and Y. S. Song. Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2013:
20th International Conference, Burnaby, BC, Canada, August 14-16, 2013, Revised
Selected Papers, chapter A Group Action on Z×p and the Generalized DLP with
Auxiliary Inputs, pages 121–135. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2014.
25. C.-K. Chu, S. S. M. Chow, W.-G. Tzeng, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng. Key-aggregate
cryptosystem for scalable data sharing in cloud storage. IEEE Trans. Parallel
Distrib. Syst., 25(2):468–477, Feb. 2014.
26. H. Cohen and G. Frey, editors. Handbook of elliptic and hyperelliptic curve cryp-
tography. CRC Press, 2005.
27. J.-S. Coron and D. Naccache. Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2003: 9th
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Infor-
mation Security, Taipei, Taiwan, November 30 – December 4, 2003. Proceedings,
chapter Boneh et al.’s k-Element Aggregate Extraction Assumption Is Equivalent
to the Diffie-Hellman Assumption, pages 392–397. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2003.
Still Wrong Use of Pairings in Cryptography 21
28. A. Enge and J. Milan. Implementing cryptographic pairings at standard security
levels. volume 8804 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 28–46. Springer
International Publishing, 2014.
29. L. Fang, W. Susilo, C. Ge, and J. Wang. Public key encryption with keyword
search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle. Informa-
tion Sciences, 238:221 – 241, 2013.
30. D. Freeman, M. Scott, and E. Teske. A taxonomy of pairing-friendly elliptic curves.
Journal of Cryptology, 23(2):224–280, 2010.
31. E. S. V. Freire. Non-interactive key exchange and key assignment schemes. In Phd
Thesis inproceedingsinproceedingsStanford University, 2014.
32. G. Frey and H.-G. Ru¨ck. A remark concerning m-divisibility and the discrete
logarithm in the divisor class group of curves. Math. Comput., 62(206):865–874,
Apr. 1994.
33. S. D. Galbraith and P. Gaudry. Recent progress on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 78(1):51–72, 2015.
34. S. D. Galbraith, F. Hess, and F. Vercauteren. Aspects of pairing inversion. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 54(12):5719–5728, 2008.
35. S. D. Galbraith, K. G. Paterson, and N. P. Smart. Pairings for cryptographers.
Discrete Appl. Math., 156(16):3113–3121, 2008.
36. U. Ghosh and R. Datta. A secure addressing scheme for large-scale managed
manets. Network and Service Management, IEEE Transactions on, 12(3):483–495,
Sept 2015.
37. F. Go¨log˘lu, R. Granger, G. McGuire, and J. Zumbra¨gel. On the Function Field
Sieve and the Impact of Higher Splitting Probabilities, pages 109–128. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
38. Y. Gong, Y. Cai, Y. Guo, and Y. Fang. A privacy-preserving scheme for incentive-
based demand response in the smart grid. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on,
(99):1–1, 2015.
39. R. Granger, T. Kleinjung, and J. Zumbra¨gel. Breaking ‘128-bit Secure’ Supersingu-
lar Binary Curves, pages 126–145. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2014.
40. R. Granger, T. Kleinjung, and J. Zumbra¨gel. On the discrete logarithm problem
in finite fields of fixed characteristic. http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.01495, 2015.
41. F. Hess. Pairing lattices. In S. Galbraith and K. Paterson, editors, Pairing-Based
Cryptography Pairing 2008, volume 5209 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 18–38. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
42. L. Hitt. Pairing-Based Cryptography – Pairing 2007: First International Confer-
ence, Tokyo, Japan, July 2-4, 2007. Proceedings, chapter On the Minimal Embed-
ding Field, pages 294–301. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.
43. D. Hofheinz and T. Jager. Tightly secure signatures and public-key encryption.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, pages 1–33, 2015.
44. J. Y. Hwang, D. H. Choi, H. Cho, and B. Song. New efficient batch verification
for an identity-based signature scheme. Security and Communication Networks,
8(15):2524–2535, 2015.
45. J. Jeong and T. Kim. Extended tower number field sieve with application to finite
fields of arbitrary composite extension degree. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2016:526, 2016.
46. A. Joux and K. Nguyen. Separating decision diffie–hellman from computational
diffie–hellman in cryptographic groups. Journal of Cryptology, 16(4):239–247, 2003.
22 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
47. A. Joux and C. Pierrot. Technical history of discrete logarithms in small charac-
teristic finite fields. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 78(1):73–85, 2016.
48. T. Kim and R. Barbulescu. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 32nd An-
nual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2012. Pro-
ceedings, chapter Extended Tower Number Field Sieve: A New Complexity for the
Medium Prime Case. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016.
49. A. Kundu and E. Bertino. Privacy-preserving authentication of trees and graphs.
International Journal of Information Security, 12(6):467–494, 2013.
50. N. P. S. L. Chen, Z. Cheng. Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings.
International Journal of Information Security, 6(4):213–241, 2007.
51. K. Lee. Self-updatable encryption with short public parameters and its extensions.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 79(1):121–161, 2016.
52. A. Lewko, T. Okamoto, A. Sahai, K. Takashima, and B. Waters. Advances in Cryp-
tology – EUROCRYPT 2010: 29th Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, French Riviera, May 30 – June 3,
2010. Proceedings, chapter Fully Secure Functional Encryption: Attribute-Based
Encryption and (Hierarchical) Inner Product Encryption, pages 62–91. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.
53. A. Lewko and B. Waters. Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011: 30th
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, Tallinn, Estonia, May 15-19, 2011. Proceedings, chapter Decentral-
izing Attribute-Based Encryption, pages 568–588. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011.
54. F. Li and P. Xiong. Practical secure communication for integrating wireless sensor
networks into the internet of things. Sensors Journal, IEEE, 13(10):3677–3684,
2013.
55. F. Li, Z. Zheng, and C. Jin. Identity-based deniable authenticated encryption and
its application to e-mail system. Telecommunication Systems, pages 1–15, 2015.
56. H. Li, Y. Dai, L. Tian, and H. Yang. Cloud Computing: First International Confer-
ence, CloudCom 2009, Beijing, China, December 1-4, 2009. Proceedings, chapter
Identity-Based Authentication for Cloud Computing, pages 157–166. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009.
57. B. Libert, T. Peters, M. Joye, and M. Yung. Linearly homomorphic structure-
preserving signatures and their applications. Designs, Codes and Cryptography,
77(2):441–477, 2015.
58. C. Liu, C. Yang, X. Zhang, and J. Chen. External integrity verification for out-
sourced big data in cloud and iot. Future Gener. Comput. Syst., 49(C):58–67, Aug.
2015.
59. J. Liu, Z. Zhang, X. Chen, and K. S. Kwak. Certificateless remote anonymous
authentication schemes for wirelessbody area networks. Parallel and Distributed
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 25(2):332–342, 2014.
60. Z. Liu, J. Li, X. Chen, J. Yang, and C. Jia. Information Security and Privacy:
19th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2014, Wollongong, NSW, Australia, July
7-9, 2014. Proceedings, chapter TMDS: Thin-Model Data Sharing Scheme Sup-
porting Keyword Search in Cloud Storage, pages 115–130. Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 2014.
61. A. Lounis, A. Hadjidj, A. Bouabdallah, and Y. Challal. Secure and scalable cloud-
based architecture for e-health wireless sensor networks. In Computer Commu-
nications and Networks (ICCCN), 2012 21st International Conference on, pages
1–7, 2012.
Still Wrong Use of Pairings in Cryptography 23
62. H. Lu, J. Li, and M. Guizani. Secure and efficient data transmission for cluster-
based wireless sensor networks. Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transac-
tions on, 25(3):750–761, 2014.
63. F. Luca, D. J. Mireles, and I. E. Shparlinski. Mov attack in various subgroups on
elliptic curves. Illinois Journal of Mathematics, 48(3):10411052, 2004.
64. M. Massierer. Some experiments investigating a possible L(1/4) algorithm for the
discrete logarithm problem in algebraic curves. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2014:996, 2014.
65. A. Menezes, T. Okamoto, and S. Vanstone. Reducing elliptic curve logarithms
to logarithms in a finite field. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on,
39(5):1639–1646, 1993.
66. D. Moody, R. Peralta, R. Perlner, A. Regenscheid, A. Roginsky, and L. Chen.
Journal of Research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. volume
120, pages 11–27. February 2015.
67. N. E. Mrabet, N. Guillermin, and S. Ionica. A study of pairing computation
for elliptic curves with embedding degree 15. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2009:370, 2009.
68. L. Nkenyereye and K. Rhee. Secure traffic data transmission protocol for vehicular
cloud. In Advances in Computer Science and Ubiquitous Computing, volume 373 of
Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, pages 497–503. Springer Singapore, 2015.
69. A. M. Odlyzko. Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 84 A Work-
shop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques Paris, France,
April 9– 11, 1984, chapter Discrete logarithms in finite fields and their crypto-
graphic significance, pages 224–314. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 1985.
70. T. Okamoto and K. Takashima. Achieving short ciphertexts or short secret-keys
for adaptively secure general inner-product encryption. Designs, Codes and Cryp-
tography, 77(2):725–771, 2015.
71. S. C. Ramanna, S. Chatterjee, and P. Sarkar. Public Key Cryptography – PKC
2012: 15th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryp-
tography, Darmstadt, Germany, May 21-23, 2012. Proceedings, chapter Variants
of Waters’ Dual System Primitives Using Asymmetric Pairings, pages 298–315.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012.
72. P. Sarkar and S. Singh. A General Polynomial Selection Method and New Asymp-
totic Complexities for the Tower Number Field Sieve Algorithm. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016.
73. I. Semaev. New algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015.
74. H. Shacham. New Paradigms in Signature Schemes. PhD thesis, Stanford, CA,
USA, 2006.
75. H. Shacham and B. Waters. Compact proofs of retrievability. In Advances in Cryp-
tology - ASIACRYPT 2008, volume 5350 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 90–107. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
76. V. Shoup. Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’97: International Conference
on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques Konstanz, Germany,
May 11–15, 1997 Proceedings, chapter Lower Bounds for Discrete Logarithms and
Related Problems, pages 256–266. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
1997.
77. J. Tsai. A new efficient certificateless short signature scheme using bilinear pair-
ings. Systems Journal, IEEE, PP(99):1–8, 2015.
24 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
78. Y.-M. Tseng, Y.-H. Huang, and H.-J. Chang. Cca-secure anonymous multi-receiver
id-based encryption. In Advanced Information Networking and Applications Work-
shops (WAINA), 2012 26th International Conference on, pages 177–182, March
2012.
79. C. Wang, D. Shi, X. Xu, and J. Fang. An anonymous data access scheme for
vanet using pseudonym-based cryptography. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and
Humanized Computing, pages 1–9, 2015.
80. H. Wang. Identity-based distributed provable data possession in multicloud stor-
age. Services Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 8(2):328–340, 2015.
81. Y. Wang. Transactions on Computational Science XVII, chapter Efficient Identity-
Based and Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol, pages 172–197. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
82. B. Waters. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009: 29th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16-20, 2009. Proceed-
ings, chapter Dual System Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE under
Simple Assumptions, pages 619–636. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
83. Y. Xie and Y. Zhang. A secure, service priority-based incentive scheme for delay
tolerant networks. Security and Communication Networks, 9(1):5–18, 2016.
84. P. Xu, Q. Wu, W. Wang, W. Susilo, J. Domingo-Ferrer, and H. Jin. Generating
searchable public-key ciphertexts with hidden structures for fast keyword search.
Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 10(9):1993–2006, 2015.
85. E. Zavattoni, L. Dominguez Perez, S. Mitsunari, A. Sanchez-Ramrez, T. Teruya,
and F. Rodriguez-Henriquez. Software implementation of an attribute-based en-
cryption scheme. Computers, IEEE Transactions on, 64(5):1429–1441, May 2015.
Appendix
A Application Areas of Pairings
Pairing-based cryptography is being considered for alternative construc-
tions in many areas of cryptographic research. It is an active research
area for deploying novel security and privacy mechanisms, e.g., [5, 9, 18,
22, 28, 31, 36, 38, 44, 55, 59, 68, 77, 79, 84, 85]. These include the following
applications:
Identity based encryption (IBE) [13]: It is a special type of public-
key encryption in which a publicly known identifier is used as a public key.
More concretely, a trusted third party first generates its public/private
key pair which is called “master” public key and “master” private key.
Next, a user’s public key is replaced with an identity (e.g., an email, an
address, a photo, a phone number, a post address) and his/her private
key is computed based on the identity and master private key. IBE al-
lows the user to send an encrypted message to another user using his/her
identity as a public key and the user decrypts it with the corresponding
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public key. IBE based schemes do not require public-key generation and
distribution as it exists in the conventional public key systems, which
significantly reduce/eliminate the cost and complexity of generating and
managing users’ certificates (i.e., a public key infrastructure). It has fur-
ther an interesting property that private keys need not to be generated
before sending an encrypted message.
Hierarchical identity-based Encryption (HIBE) [11]: It allows the
private key generator to delegate its computation to the lower-level pri-
vate key generators. Furthermore, anonymous HIBE is an extension of
IBE which hides not only the message itself but also the identity of the
users. Anonymous HIBE solutions can be applied to anonymous com-
munication systems and public key encryption systems with a keyword
searching mechanism.
Functional (or Attribute based) Encryption [52,53]: It uses pair-
ings to generate decryption keys which allows a user possessing an en-
crypted data Enc(x) to compute f(x) of the data for an arbitrary function
f .
IBE with threshold decryption [7]: The master key of the trusted
third party of a standard IBE system can be distributed in a (k, n) fashion
among n different independent authorities, where at least k of them must
cooperate and collude to perform decryption (using conventional tech-
niques of threshold cryptography like Shamir secret sharing schemes).
Searchable encryption [29]: It allows a user to compute whether a
given keyword exists in an encrypted message without giving away any
information about the message itself. In practice, it is possible to search
any query on an encrypted database without decryption (e.g., patient
medical records, biometric data, personal data, corporate data, intellec-
tual property).
Signatures [10,75]: Digital signatures is an important primitive which
ensures authentication, integrity of a message, and non-repudiation. Apart
from conventional signature schemes (based on RSA or ECC) pairing/ID
based signatures are constructed because of some nice structural prop-
erties like homomorphic linear authenticators where the authenticators
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can be aggregated into only one tag, which significantly reduces the com-
munication and computational complexity. Other types of pairing-based
signature schemes include short signatures (also without random oracles),
blind signatures (where a user obtains a signature from a signer while the
signer does not learn any information about the message being signed),
identity based signatures (also including ID-based blind signatures, hi-
erarchical ID-based signatures, ring signatures), chameleon signatures
(non-repudiable and non-transferrable), aggregate signatures (which al-
lows multiple signatures to be aggregated into one compact signature),
ring signatures (where any group member can sign a message without
learning any information about the signed message), group signatures
(which is similar to ring signatures except that a “group manager” can de-
tect which group member indeed signed a message), threshold signatures
(a valid signature can be computed only if at least t signers cooperate),
authentication-tree based signatures without random oracles.
New security requirements for cloud & IoT security: Privacy
enhancing techniques (like privacy-preserving auctions, anonymous cre-
dentials, or privacy-friendly aggregation for the smart grid), proofs of
retrievability of data for cloud storage systems [75], internet of things
(IoT) [54], e-health systems and wearable technologies [61].
Other applications: Last but not least, there are also various ID based
mechanisms including authentication [16,56], identity based key-agreement
[21,81], signcryption (which is a public key authenticated encryption, i.e.
including both signing and encrypting operations simultaneously), and
identity based Chameleon hashes [6] (which are collision resistant func-
tions with a trapdoor for finding collisions).
